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Abstract
The current level and future evolution of trans-Pacific business linkages are tightly linked to
domestic politics in Latin American countries. Where the structure of a nation's political
institutions offer credible checks and balances against discretionary policymaking, external
linkages including those with Pacific partners are stronger. Future liberalization including the
formation of an FTAA is more likely when new policymakers arrive in office or when existing
policymakers feel strong internal or external pressure to shift the course of their trade policy. A
given liberalization is more likely to be sustained when coupled with short-term observable
improvement in social and economic indicators. Countries with political institutions that fail to
limit policymakers' discretion are particularly sensitive to a failure to demonstrate clear and
immediate results. An analysis of the potential of an FTAA to influence trans-Pacific business
linkages based on these arguments suggests that adoption is far from certain and that northern and
southern countries alike will have to design an agreement with particular attention to social and
economic consequences in Latin American countries.
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1. Introduction
The Latin American country with the strongest trans-Pacific business
linkages is neither Peru with its strong historical ties to Japan, nor Mexico with its
gateway to the United States market, but rather Chile with its well-consolidated
democratic institutions and strong belief in the rule of law. This counterintuitive
statistic highlights the important role of political institutions and political
preferences in the scale, scope, and evolution of trans-Pacific business linkages.
The relationship between these two variables is not, however, a simple one. The
choice to open a country to foreign trade and capital flows is influenced by
political costs and benefits, and the sustainability of that decision rests on the
political support that liberalizing politicians engender and maintain. I use the
heterogeneity provided by the Latin American postwar experience to examine the
political influences on trade policy in general and on the development of transPacific business linkages in particular.
While not denying or seeking to minimize the importance of shifts in the
effective size of the Latin American market or the cost of trade between Latin
America and NAFTA (Markusen, 2004) that may engender substantial shifts in
trans-Pacific business linkages and strategies (Frischtak 2004), I seek to craft a
linkage between the long-term importance of market-supporting institutions for
economic growth and prosperity (Vial, 2003; Huang, Yeung, and Morck, 2004)
and the political dynamic unleashed by the FTAA. Without such attention to
institutional dynamics, the difficult compromises needed to secure the passage of
the FTAA may be overlooked. Even if these hurdles are overcome and the FTAA
is enacted, Latin American countries may squander the potential opportunity that
it generates or, even worse, unleash a negative feedback that could undermine the
long-term development of market supporting institutions. Huang, Yeung, and
Morck (2004) provide an historical overview of the liberalization boom in
ASEAN that they claim has failed to sufficiently develop local institutions in a
manner that will provide the basis for long-term sustainable domestic growth.
Particularly in light of the relatively poor perceptions of Latin American
institutions (Vial, 2003) and the heightened attention paid to such dimensions in
the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, the cautionary tale on the experience of
ASEAN should highlight the importance of ex ante attention and focus on the
process of liberalization and its dynamic impact on local institutional
development.
I begin such an analysis by briefly reviewing the recent history of Latin
American economic linkages, which I will subsequently draw upon in the
examination of specific relationships between political institutions, external
shocks and pressures, social indicators and the level, growth and sustainability of
trans-Pacific business linkages. Next, I survey extant research highlighting the

1
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importance of political institutions and political preferences for the international
investment decisions of Asian multinational corporations. This discussion gives
rise to specific propositions linking the development of political institutions that
limit the discretion of incumbent policymakers to the depth and sustainability of a
nation’s external business linkages which are corroborated by the data. Having
established this association among levels, I then consider the causal mechanisms
through which political institutions and preferences may generate policies, which
enhance business linkages such as the FTAA and, the conditions under which
such policies are robust to backsliding or retrenchment. Once again, preliminary
exploration of the data is corroborative. Next, I consider potential positive and
negative feedback mechanisms between liberalizing policies and institutional
development. Finally, I conclude by considering the likely impact on trans-Pacific
business linkages of the potential passage of a Free Trade of the Americas
Agreement. I highlight the countries most likely to benefit at the current time and
the types of political, economic and social reforms that would enhance these
potential benefits. I also suggest avenues for future research that could explore
some of the proposed relationships in more detail.
2. Background
Latin American countries have on average become substantially more linked to
the external environment as demonstrated by Figure 1 which plots the population
weighted (top panel) and unweighted (bottom panel) average level of trade as a
percentage of GDP, foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP (both gross
and net), portfolio investment (both bonds and equity) as a percentage of GDP,
and foreign aid as a percentage of GDP.1 The definition of such events is
inherently arbitrary and made more difficult still by the gap between de jure
announcements of liberalization and de facto occurrences particularly given the
rise of non-tariff barriers and other non-transparent mechanisms for impeding
such linkages. As a result, I rely upon these outcome measures of external
linkages rather than the policies that may or may not give rise to such linkages.

1

Throughout the analysis that follows, I draw from broad social science literatures in international
political economy and international business to develop a richer understanding of the determinants
of cross-national and intertemporal variation in trans-Pacific business linkages. While the
supporting evidence is drawn from international samples of investors, trade flows, and
policymakers, there is good reason to expect that the link between trans-Pacific business linkages
and political institutions will mirror these broader trends. Notably, the correlation between transPacific trade flows and overall trade flows exceeds 0.50. I therefore expect that the political
factors which shape firm decision-making regarding foreign direct investment and the evolution of
trade flows globally to be similarly operative on corresponding trans-Pacific business linkages.
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An examination of these aggregate statistics highlights the dramatic
expansion of external linkages in the 1986-2000 period. By contrast, the increases
leading up to the Latin American debt crisis were relatively minor particularly
when considering private capital flows or examined using population weighted
data. The aggregate political indicators are also characterized by a substantial
break in trend though the increase in democratization and checks and balances in
the political system predated the expansion in external linkages by a few years.
After decreases of a modest scale on an unweighted scale (top panel) and a more
substantive scale on a population weighted scale (bottom panel), the political
indicators plotted in Figure 2 demonstrate a marked improvement beginning in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Figure 3, which plots various types of regimes,
confirms this trend showing a steady and dramatic increase in the number of
stable democracies starting in 1981.
Table 1 lists notable expansions and contraction of external linkages and
changes in political institutions or economic conditions at the national level for
the twenty one countries in Latin America with a population greater than one
million where an expansion (contraction) in external linkages is defined as an
increase (decrease) of more than 5% of GDP and more than 20% of the initial
level of trade or investment sustained for at least three years. I summarize these
country narratives in Appendix 1. Next, drawing from literature in international
political economy, institutional theory, and multinational strategy, I attempt to
isolate political, economic, and social factors that help explain a country’s level,
change in and sustainability of trans-Pacific business linkages.
3. Political Institutions and Multinational Investment2
To successfully deploy its resources in a new country, a multinational firm must
identify and contend with numerous differences between the host country market
and the markets in which it has previously operated (Beamish, 1988, Hymer,
1976, Martin, Swaminathan, & Mitchell, 1998, Zaheer, 1995). Laws and
regulations surrounding the acquisition of property, licensing of new businesses,
hiring of workers, importing factors of production, exporting output or capital,
contracting with suppliers for needed inputs, payment of taxes, government
licenses and fees, and the means and feasibility of exit all vary widely across
countries. Even where laws and regulations appear similar, differences in legal
systems can have important differences in such relevant outcomes as the
protection afforded to shareholders versus creditors or minority investors (La
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999). A recent study that examined regulations of entry in
2

The following section draws from Henisz and Delios (2002).
3

Brought to you by | University of Pennsylvania
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/7/16 4:18 PM

Business and Politics, Vol. 6 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 2

seventy five countries found that the official procedures and costs required to start
a new business varied from as few as two procedures (Canada) taking two days
(Canada) and 0.4% of average per capita income (New Zealand) to as many as
twenty procedures (Bolivia) requiring up to 174 days (Mozambique) and 263% of
average per capita income (Bolivia) (Djankov, Porta, Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000).
The World Bank expanded and updated this study, finding Laos, Haiti and Congo
(198, 203 and 215 days), and Belarus (1000% of average per capita income) to be
even more hostile to entrepreneurship (World Bank, 2004). The same study found
strong negative correlations between these regulatory burdens and per capita
income levels across countries.
In addition to the costs of starting a new business, political, and regulatory
hurdles can impose substantial costs on the day-to-day operations of an overseas
subsidiary. Where policymakers can act unilaterally or have high certainty that a
subservient or allied legislature and judicial branch will support their actions,
future policies are likely to be more volatile in response to either exogenous
shocks, changes in the identity of policymakers or even changes in the
preferences of the existing policymakers (Henisz, 2004). Such changes that are
the result of direct lobbying by host country competitors or incumbents are of
particular concern to multinationals.
Institutional differences between nations magnify difficulties in collecting,
interpreting and organizing the relevant information necessary to mount a
successful entry. Markets that are similar in political structure pose less
uncertainty, relatively lower costs of entry and, therefore, lower hurdle rates of
return. Investors are hence more likely to enter countries where the future policy
regime is relatively easy to predict (Bennet & Green, 1972, Fine, 2003,
Gastanaga, Nugent, & Pashamova, 1998, Green & Cunningham, 1975, Huang,
Morck, & Yeung, 2004, Loree & Guisinger, 1995, Root & Ahmed, 1978,
Stobaugh, 1969, Vernon, 1977, Vial, 2003, Wei, 2000), however, as shown in
samples of Japanese multinationals, this tendency may be attenuated for firms
with relevant experience in the host country (Henisz & Delios, 2001) or other
politically hazardous markets (Delios & Henisz, 2003b).
The impact of institutions on entry strategies can extend beyond the choice
of where to invest to include the design of the subsidiary. For example, firms that
perceive hazards emanating from policy uncertainty can take hazard-mitigating
actions designed to shift the decision calculus of the potential expropriating
government. Such a shift should seek to either raise the political and/or economic
costs (lost revenue, employment, and future investment) to asset or revenue
expropriation, or lower the benefits (the value of seized assets or revenue stream
and the nationalist political reaction) from expropriation.
As an example of a hazard mitigating strategy, a multinational can form a
partnership with a host country firm. In such a partnership, the host country firm
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would also suffer in the event of an expropriation of a foreign subsidiary’s returns
or its assets because of the subsidiary's dependence on a continuing relationship
with its parent firms for its complementary assets. In exchange for ownership in
the foreign subsidiary, a host country partner provides a valuable service. Host
country firms tend to use, on average, a greater percentage of domestic inputs.
Because of superior information regarding the availability of, terms of, and
procedures for acquiring goods in the domestic market, host country partners rely
more heavily than the multinational on domestically-sourced labor, intermediate
products, and trading partners. While a multinational may pay to acquire this form
of local information, pursuing such a strategy raises production costs relative to
domestic firms.
Depending on the size of this cost wedge, a multinational shifts some
positive quantity of inputs from domestic to international sourcing (Markusen,
2003). Expropriation of the assets or revenue stream of a joint venture between a
multinational and a host country partner will therefore result in a greater
expropriation of assets or revenue streams owned by domestic constituents than
expropriation of a solely foreign venture. As more domestic constituents are
implicated in the expropriation, a partnership between a multinational and a host
country firm is, on average, politically more costly to expropriate for the
government than a solely foreign venture.3 Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Hill,
Hwang and Kim (1990), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992), Oxley (1999), Delios
& Beamish (1999), Smarzynska (2000), and Henisz (2000) provide empirical
evidence supporting this link between market entry mode choice and the degree of
policy uncertainty while Delios and Henisz (2000) demonstrate that this
relationship is attenuated for Japanese multinational corporations with relevant
experience.4
In addition to the choice of entry mode, the type of assets chosen for
overseas investment may vary across different institutional structures. Empirical
work that has adopted a case study approach provides strong support for the
hypothesis that long-lived and/or politically visible investments such as those in
infrastructure sectors will be particularly sensitive to a country's institutional
environment (Bergara Duque, Henisz, & Spiller, 1998, Caballero & Hammour,
1998, Crain & Oakley, 1995, Dailami & Leipziger, 1998, Daniels & Trebilcock,
1994, Grandy, 1989, Levy & Spiller, 1994, Levy & Spiller, 1996 , Ramamurti,
1996, Savedoff & Spiller, 1997, Spiller & Vogelsang, 1996, Williamson, 1976).
Two recent efforts to extend this logic to panel datasets in telecommunications
3

This hypothesis is strongly supported by the only available empirical study (Bradley, (1977)).
The author finds that expropriation of joint ventures exclusively between foreign multinationals is
eight times as likely as expropriation of joint ventures that involve local partners.
4
Henisz (2000) demonstrates that this relationship is conditional upon the nature of the assets
under the purview of the overseas subsidiary.
5
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(Henisz & Zelner, 2001) and electricity (Henisz & Zelner, 2002) have also found
strong support for the hypothesis that political institutions that fail to constrain
arbitrary behavior by political actors dampen the incentive for infrastructure
providers to deploy capital and, ceteris paribus, yield lower levels of per capita
infrastructure investment.
Another relevant dimension of heterogeneity is that between sales offices
which sell imported or domestically produces manufacturing output in
competition with local producers and manufacturing plants that sell exclusively or
primarily to foreign customers. The former are more likely to incite political
opposition whereas the latter may enjoy strong political support. Multinational
firms’ entry choices may therefore reflect a calculation not merely on the
economics or cultural drivers of the timing of opening a local sales office but also
on the political dimension as shown in a sample of Japanese multinational
corporations by Delios and Henisz (2003a).
Unstable policy regimes and culturally dissimilar markets are likely
associated with performance penalties as well. Carroll and Delacroix (1982) find
higher mortality rates for newspapers in Argentina and Ireland during periods of
political unrest. Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) find that the failure rates of
foreign firms in the financial service sector are higher in more tightly regulated
and less globally integrated markets. Henisz and Delios (2003) find that in
countries with greater policy uncertainty, subsidiary mortality for Japanese
multinationals is higher although this effect is moderated for firms with relevant
local experience. Casanova (2004) discusses the performance benefits of staying
within the multinational corporation’s “natural markets.” Li and Guisinger (1991)
find an analogous relationship between cultural proximity and survival as do
Barkema, Bell, and Pennings (1996) and Barkema and Vermeulen (1997).
As political institutions influence such core elements of multinational
decision-making as the choice of where to invest, how to organize that
investment, and when to terminate the investment, we expect political institutions
to similarly influence the development of trans-Pacific business linkages. Welldeveloped institutional structures that provide greater checks and balances against
arbitrary or capricious policymaking should enjoy greater and more robust transPacific business linkages:
Proposition 1a (P1a): Countries with stronger checks and balances
against political discretion will possess stronger trans-Pacific business
linkages.
Proposition 1b (H1b): Countries with stronger checks and balances
against political discretion will possess trans-Pacific business linkages
that are more robust to change.
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Taken together the experience of the twenty one Latin American countries
provides strong corroborative evidence for this pair of propositions. All the
country-level measures of political institutions aggregated in Figure 2 are
positively correlated with each of the country-level measures of openness
aggregated in Figure 1 with correlations between the various political indicators
and flows of trade and foreign direct investment ranging from 0.13 to 0.27.
Further empirical analysis controlling for country size, membership in
intergovernmental organizations, economic performance and the like continue to
demonstrate a positive association between a country’s external linkages and the
development of political institutions which provide a credible commitment to
investors that policies will not be changed in an arbitrary or capricious manner
(Henisz & Mansfield, 2004).
4. The Determinants of Sustainable Liberalization vs. Retrenchment
Understanding the future course of trans-Pacific business linkages requires not
only an understanding of the medium or long-term effects of political institutions
already in place but also an understanding of the political discontinuities that
trigger sudden changes in policy that make a country more or less attractive to
foreign investors. Academic accounts of liberalizing reforms in Latin America
(Armijo & Faucher, 2001, Biglaiser & Brown, 2003, Morley, Machado, &
Pettinato, 1999, Murillo, 2001, Remmer, 1990, Starr, 2002) as well as more
popular accounts of recent reversions from market oriented trade reforms in
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, stress the discontinuous or episodic nature
of these events. Fritschtak (2004) highlights the importance of three such
discontinuous regional trade liberalizations (NAFTA, Caricom, and
MERCOSUR) for multinational investment patterns to date. Huang, Morck, and
Yeung (2004), by contrast, provide a cautionary tale of the potentially temporary
benefits of liberalization in ASEAN countries that failed to upgrade their
domestic institutions. Vial (2003) emphasizes the extensive institutional
development needed in much of Latin America just to reach the levels of ASEAN.
Predicting the future course of trans-Pacific business linkages including future
expansions and contractions therefore requires an assessment of not only the
political institutions that constrain policymakers from altering current policies but
also the forces that encourage them to liberalize or retrench and the feedback
mechanisms between liberalization and institutional upgrading.
Liberalization. Academics examining the political determinants of trade
liberalization have examined many different theoretical relationships finding
generally mixed support for each depending on the sample of countries and years
chosen for analysis. Does democratization generate pressures for liberalization

7
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due to the economic efficiencies that benefit the median voter (Mansfield, Milner,
& Rosendorff, 2002) or protectionism due to the greater weight attached to
concentration of costs in temporal, geographic, and interest group dimensions as
opposed to the more diffuse long-term benefits (Conybeare, 1991, Goldstein &
Lenway, 1989, Nollen & Quinn, 1994)? Does poor economic and social
performance trigger calls for protectionism by insecure polities (Magee, Brock, &
Leslie Young, 1989) or provide the momentum to overcome coalitions blocking
welfare-enhancing reforms (Alesina & Drazen, 1991, Drazen & Grilli, 1993,
Fernandez & Rodrik, 1991, Kingdon, 1984, Nelson, 1990, Williamson, 1993)? Do
a greater number of veto players in the policymaking process provide for a status
quo bias in policymaking (Cowhey, 1993, Delmas & Terlaak, 2003, Goldstein,
1988, Goldstein & Lenway, 1989) or for voice for a wider array of interest groups
(Frye & Mansfield, 2002)? The unsatisfying answer to even this basic set of
questions linking national political institutions to trade policy is that it depends.
In order to ascertain the nature of the contingencies linking political
institutions, economic, and social outcomes and trade policy, I draw upon the
theoretical framework developed in Henisz and Zelner (2004). That paper
develops a neo-institutional theory of the policymaking process. As political
actors face multiple demands for new policies and are severely limited in the time
that they can focus on the policymaking process, effecting policy change–
particularly in a domain that impacts such a broad constituency as trade policy–
typically requires that interest groups who favor a change in policy, for either selfinterested or ideological reasons, develop a coalition with other interest groups
who are only marginally affected or unaffected by the policy change. Such
coalition formation is facilitated by the development of a master frame (Benford
& Snow, 2000) that situates trade policy as part of a broader bundle of policies
that must be altered to deal with an economic or social challenge. The resulting
pressures for policy change are, however, mediated by country-level institutional
structures that govern the policymaking process. Where these institutions create
multiple checks and balances they create a status quo bias that requires a greater
level of pressure to realize a given policy change.
Consider for example the decision to liberalize an economy that is
relatively closed. Given the economic inefficiencies associated with
protectionism, the existence of such a status quo policy indicates the existence of
a strong political coalition that benefits from protectionism through ownership of
import substituting industries or import licenses. Breaking that political coalition
likely requires a change in political regime that involves a substantive change in
the identity of the interest groups influencing economic policy such as occurs in
the aftermath of a change in political regime or political leadership. Within an
existing regime, such a change in policy could still result due to strong internal or
external pressure for a policy change that overwhelms the blocking coalition. For
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example, an economic crisis with steep social costs raises the costs of inaction
making any policy change regardless of its short-term costs relatively more
attractive (Alesina & Drazen, 1991, Drazen & Grilli, 1993, Fernandez & Rodrik,
1991, Nelson, 1990, Williamson, 1993). A crisis may serve as a “focusing event”
(Kingdon, 1984: 106) that moves reform to the top of the policymaking agenda
(Hoffman, 1999, Seo & Creed, 2002) by increasing the short-run costs of inaction.
Only in this circumstance is radical reform such as a shift to market-oriented
policies likely to occur (Astley, 1985, Jones, Baumgartner, & True, 1998,
Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). Empirical support for this relationship can be
found in studies of how poorly mediated distributional conflict precipitated
monetarist revolutions in Chile and Britain (Fourcade-Courinchas & Babb, 2002),
broad macroeconomic crises led to the adoption of market-oriented reform
adoption in Latin America (Armijo & Faucher, 2001, Lora, 2000, Remmer, 1998),
and the adoption of capital account liberalization (Brune & Guisinger, 2003), or
privatization programs globally (Banerjee & Munger, 2002).
Alternatively, the example provided by liberalizing neighbor or the
external pressure provided by conditional financing from multilateral institutions
could provide the sort of reference point needed to overcome domestic opposition
(Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986, Manuel Pastor, 1993). Prior empirical
studies emphasizing policy emulation include Collier and Messick’s (1975) study
of the adoption of social security systems, Knoke’s (1982) analysis of the
adoption of municipal reform in the 267 largest US cities, Kobrin’s (1985) study
of oil nationalization, Weyland’s (2003) study of the diffusion of pension
privatization, Guler et al.´s (2002) study of the adoption of quality certification,
Brune and Guisinger’s (2003) study of capital account liberalization, and Yerba’s
(2002, 2003) studies of the diffusion of neo-liberal macroeconomic policies.
Another channel for international pressure to influence domestic
policymaking is through the interactions between multilateral development
agencies or private international lenders and their clients. Several unpublished
empirical studies have found evidence of the coercive influence of multilateral
development agencies on the likelihood of capital account liberalization (Brune &
Guisinger, 2003), the adoption of Central Bank Independence (McNamara &
Castro, 2003), and the promulgation of national right to information or
transparency laws (Roberts, 2003). The notion of dependency upon international
capital markets as a driver of domestic reforms has a similarly long intellectual
lineage (Hirschman, 1958, Hirschman, 1968, Prebisch, 1950, Wallerstein, 1974).
Proposition 2: Liberalization of trans-Pacific business linkages is more
likely in relatively closed economies
(P2a) after a regime change that enfranchises new interest groups
(P2b) after an economic crisis

9
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(P2c) in response to external pressure provided by
the liberalization of trading partners
the conditionality of external funding
the dependence on international financial markets.
Returning to the context of Latin America, expansions and contractions in
external linkages are closely related to change in political regime (P2a). Of the
seventy episodes observed (thirty eight liberalizations and thirty two
retrenchments), twenty nine were shortly preceded by a change in political
regime. Interestingly, while the dominant correlation was for democratization to
be associated with liberalization (fourteen cases) and retrenchment to be
associated with increasing autocracy (five cases), there also existed six cases in
which democratization was associated with retrenchment and four cases in which
increased autocracy was associated with liberalization suggesting that changes in
the composition of interest groups represented in power are crucial rather than the
nature of the political regime. The tendency for a positive association between
democratization and liberalization does, however, support the claim that, on
average, democracies have a broader selectorate (Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, &
Smith, 1999).5 These twenty nine regime changes constituted almost half of the
49 shifts in political regime observed in the 1960-2000 period in Latin America.
Turning next to the role of economic crises (P2b), fifty two of the seventy
episodes were associated with a drop in real per capita incomes or an inflationary
spike or surge in unemployment. Forty nine of 126 observed recessions; twenty
six of the sixty eight observed instances of inflation increasing above then
retreating below 15%; and fifteen of the twenty eight observed spiked in
unemployment were associated with a shift in trade policy. There was no clear
association between the incidence of crisis and the direction of change in external
linkages (twenty three of the thirty two retrenchments or 72% were associated
with a macroeconomic crisis as compared to thirty of the thirty eight
liberalizations 79%). This finding demonstrates that it is not a question of whether
poor macroeconomic performance triggers retrenchment or reform but rather than
both arguments have at least some validity. Of some concern at present is the
combination of poor economic and social performance and the fact that in
nineteen of the twenty-one countries examined the last shift in trade policy was in
the direction of liberalization.
In contrast to the corroborative evidence linking external linkages to
political institutions, external shocks, external pressure in the form of trade
liberalizations by prominent trading partners, lending from multilateral agencies,
aid, or dependence on international financial markets due to high debt service
5

Thanks to Ed Mansfield for highlighting this potential explanation.
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obligations appeared to play a role in influencing trade policy regimes only in the
smaller countries if at all (P2c). The lack of a relationship using simple
correlations may, however, fail to capture the conditionality of the underlying
relationship for which other authors have found strong empirical support
(Biglaiser & Brown, 2003).
Sustainability. A second question involves the political determinants of
the sustainability of an adopted liberalization. Here we are considering those
countries that have already liberalized and the likely political support for
maintaining that policy of openness. Liberalizing involves numerous short-term
costs of adjustment including reallocation of physical and human capital into
those industries in which the country has a comparative advantage at world
market prices. These short-term costs are tangible and immediate whereas the
long-term gains of lower consumer prices seem abstract and distant. Despite the
presence of some interest groups with clear interests in sustained liberalization
(Rodrik, 1994) and the difficulty in unbundling trade liberalization from a broader
package of economic reforms (Martinelli & Tommasi, 1997, Tollison & Willett,
1979), most interest groups and voters are likely to weigh their support for trade
liberalization not on the balance of long-term gains against short-term costs but
rather on the immediately observable gains against the short-term costs. Where
these costs have faded into memory or are swamped by concurrent short-term
gains, liberalizations are more likely to persist.
Proposition 3: The sustainability or extension of trans-Pacific business
linkages is more likely
(P3a) with the passage of time
(P3b) when economic and social welfare indicators demonstrate
clear progress.
Comparing medium-term economic and social progress across Latin
American countries is extremely difficulty due to a lack of historical comparable
data, a general global upward trend in living standards, and exogenous shocks
which differentially impact countries based on their natural resource endowments,
trade patterns or the like. Rather than try to set some arbitrary threshold for
satisfactory economic and social performance and segment countries into years in
which liberalization was maintained versus reversed, I note the strong positive
association between more readily observable crises and policy reversals described
above and highlight that the dual of this finding is that in the absence of crises, the
direction of trade policy is more likely to be maintained.
Positive Feedback Loops. This political decision calculus also gives rise
to two potential feedback loops: one positive and reinforcing, the other negative
and perverse. One possibility is that the government takes the additional resources
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provided by trade liberalization either directly or indirectly (due to enhanced
willingness to invest or lend by foreigners) and invests in public goods such as
education, health care, law and order, and infrastructure. These investments lead
to a positive association between liberalization and social welfare that enhances
popular support for the reforms over time. Such investments in public goods have
almost universal legitimacy across countries. Crafting an association between the
much more controversial policy of liberalization and progress in these social
indicators enhances the legitimacy of the policy reform and, thereby, its
sustainability. Eventually, the reforms shift from being evaluated on the basis of
their outcomes (Suchman, 1995) to being taken-for-granted or broadly accepted.
This process of institutionalization creates a cognitive basis for legitimacy that
further enhances the status quo bias in policymaking (Suchman, 1995, Zucker,
1987).
Proposition 4 (P4) When social and economic welfare improve, transPacific business linkages may reinforce the development of political
institutions.
The evidence regarding potential positive feedback effects from trade
liberalization to political institutions like that of positive economic and social
performance is less than conclusive. One could posit such an effect in Chile where
post-1981 liberalization was accompanied by progress in social welfare indicators
and real per capita income and democratization has clearly been consolidated. The
simultaneous expansion of economic linkages, political rights, and social welfare
in Mexico likely enjoyed positive synergies as well. El Salvador is another
candidate for positive feedbacks as post-1990 liberalization has occurred
alongside an acceleration of progress in social and economic welfare and the
consolidation of democracy.
Negative Feedback Loops. The second possibility is that the government
squanders, pilfers, or narrowly distributes the direct or indirect gains provided by
liberalization. While the squandering or pilfering of resources can clearly be
deemed bad policy, it may appear economically efficient to effect a more narrow
distribution of resources than the polity would desire to maximize the long-term
benefits for the country (Forbes, 2000). Such a distribution could, however, be
perceived as illegitimate by the broad set of interest groups whose support is
necessary to maintain the existing level of liberalization or expand it further. A
compromise between economic efficiency and political support is therefore
implicated. This compromise will tilt more towards political support in the
absence of checks and balances that provide a status quo bias in policymaking
particularly in democratic governments where popular interest group support is
more directly related to short-term political survival.

DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1083

Brought to you by | University of Pennsylvania
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/7/16 4:18 PM

12

Henisz: The Political Economy of Trans-Pacific Business Linkages

Proposition 5 (P5) When social or economic welfare fail to increase, the
risk of a reversion in trans-Pacific business linkages is greatest in
countries with few checks and balances.
Of some succor in this regard is the dramatic increase in the level of
checks and balances among Latin American countries over the past two decades.
These political institutions that inhibit rapid changes in policies may have reduced
the incidence of retrenchments in external linkages as compared to earlier periods.
In the 1960s and 1970s, when many countries had autocratic or poorly developed
democratic institutions, declines in economic performance or social welfare
indicators frequently triggered retrenchments in trade policy. More recently, as
checks and balances have developed and democracies have become more
consolidated (See Figures 2-3), trade policy orientations have proven more
resilient to change. After altering its orientation and political regime 4 times in
1975-91 period, Argentina has continued to liberalize over the past twelve; Brazil
similarly went through four changes from 1975-89 and none in the past fourteen
years; Chile altered its policy twice from 1973-83 and then remained constant for
twenty years; Peru changed orientations four times in two decades and has since
held a liberalization orientation for fourteen; and similar patterns can be found in
many other countries where democratic consolidation occurred in the intervening
period. Recent declines in real per capita incomes and social welfare in a number
of Latin American countries do, however, question the limits on this relationship.
In thirteen of the twenty one countries, real per capita incomes remain
below levels attained in the 1970s or 1980s. In the majority of countries, social
welfare improvements are also falling short of expectations. In Bolivia, Brazil, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela social progress has been
limited while Argentina, Haiti, and Jamaica social and economic indicators are in
decline presenting challenges to the democratic regimes in these countries. The
broad based perception of stagnation or even decline in economic and social
welfare has led to the rise to office or, at least prominence, of populist leaders in a
number of countries. So far, however, with the exception of President Chavez in
Venezuela, these leaders are working within rather than against the political
system built by their predecessors. While one could surmise that the success of
these leaders’ efforts to maintain an outward orientation while simultaneously
providing for the pent up demands of their populations could have implications
for the future of the political institutions in these countries, such hypotheses
remain largely speculative at present.
5. Lessons for the Likely Incidence and Impact of the FTAA
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The propositions discussed above of the relationships between external linkages,
political institutions, economic, and social performance suggest that a Free Trade
of the Americas Agreement neither enjoys a high probability of passage nor,
should it overcome that hurdle, will it serve as a panacea for Latin American
countries or their trans-Pacific business networks. With respect to the first pair of
propositions, the lack of institutional development in Latin America (Vial, 2004)
particularly in light of investor sensitivity to institutional capacity provides a
partial explanation for the relatively low current levels of trans-Pacific business
linkages and suggests that recent gains are not necessarily sustainable.
Building upon these initial insights, Propositions 2a, 2b and 2c highlight
the uncertain adoption of the FTAA by Latin American countries. Coordinating
passage of such extensive legislation through three countries was difficult enough
in the case of NAFTA but expanding that number to over two dozen could prove
intractable. Countries that vary so much in terms of their initial level of openness,
their political and economic cycles and exposure to external pressure from peer
countries, multilateral lenders, and international financial markets will be hard
pressed to agree to a set of terms for the FTAA. Perhaps the economic gains are
substantial enough to obviate the need for these exceptional triggers. The
experience of the European Union highlights the potential for accord even among
dozens of countries with similarly disparate conditions. The fact that the European
Union began as an assembly of six much more homogeneous countries
responding to clear positive external pressure to avoid a third Franco-German war
and expanded in response to the rise of Japan as an external economic threat,
however, highlights the limits to this analogy.
Consideration of Proposition 3 extends the skepticism by noting the likely
difficulty in sustaining liberalization should the FTAA overcome the hurdle of
adoption. The majority of Latin American countries are mired in an extended
period of slow progress in or even degradation of economic and social
performance indicators despite embarking upon expansions in external linkages
that impose substantial short-term economic and political costs. One could be
tempted to interpret the patterns as offering promise for long-term benefits just
around the corner. Chile, the earliest liberalizer, has clearly consolidated its
political reforms as well as making dramatic progress in real per capita income
and social welfare indicators. A deeper inspection of the timing of the expansion
of external linkages relative to economic and social gains in Chile provides a
more cautious or even pessimistic appraisal of short- to medium-term trends for
the region. Chile liberalized and improved per capita incomes and social welfare
simultaneously thus building political support for further reforms and
liberalization. Most countries liberalized five to ten years in the past and have yet
to show sustained economic and social progress of the sort recorded in Chile
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beginning after the taming of hyperinflation in 1976-77 and continuing with a
brief albeit sharp interruption in 1983-84 for more than two decades.
The clear linkages identified between downturns or stagnation in
economic and social performance indicators and reversions in external linkages
give rise to substantial concern for the short- to medium-term policy regime.
Negative (Proposition 5) rather than positive (Proposition 4) feedback loops
appear more likely. The current wave of newly elected populist leaders in the
region faces crucial pressures to deliver to their increasingly dissatisfied
electorates. Only 16% of respondents in a recent LatinoBarometro poll were
“satisfied with free markets.” Given the emergent nature of Latin American
democratic institutions, it is possible that rather than merely triggering a policy
reversal, continued shortfalls in economic and social performance could lead to
regime change. Two-thirds of LatinoBarometro respondents indicated
dissatisfaction with the results of democracy.
The potential for a Free Trade of the Americas Agreement if adopted to
positively influence this dynamic requires responsibility from the governments of
the Latin American countries and the United States. The potential economic gains
of such an agreement are clear but the question of their distribution is paramount.
Will the benefits accrue largely to insiders or to the nation as a whole? Will the
benefits provided to Latin American countries be sufficiently large in the shortterm to be perceived as fair and equitable? Given the tenuous balance of political,
social, and economic forces, local governments must limit the potential for
narrow segments of the population to capture a disproportionate share of these
benefits.
With or without an FTAA, Latin American governments should focus on
developing political and market institutions that can support sustainable economic
and social development. Absent an FTAA, these governments can still undertake
these reforms but will have fewer resources to do so. Thus the FTAA, like
multilateral institutions, international financial institutions and Western
governments, can provide resources needed to address the growing political and
social tension in Latin America but it can not itself create the necessary
innovations to insure a positive feedback loop. Institutional development (e.g.
developing macro-level political institutions that limit the discretion of
policymakers, reducing the role of state in production, improving financial market
supervision and corporate governance) is of first-order concern.
Conditional on the realization of such institutional development, the
impact of a potential Free Trade of the Americas Agreement on trans-Pacific
business linkages will also depend crucially upon the nature of that agreement.
The United States government should strive to insure a broad distribution of gains
setting aside its strong bargaining power in these negotiations in recognition that
while it could extract the lions share of the short-term gains, doing so would
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likely lead either to the collapse of the negotiations or to the collapse of the
emergent policy regimes and, potentially, political regimes that have fostered the
development of openness, civil liberties, and political rights. The long-term
interest of the United States government includes a prosperous and democratic
Latin America. Should the United States government focus the distribution of
short-term economic benefits exclusively on those countries that can provide
resources of use in the War on Terror, it might well be creating a long-term threat
close to home.
Should the FTAA overcome the hurdles of adoption and provide for an
equitable distribution of gains within and across countries, political and
institutional reforms may be consolidated and trans-Pacific linkages will likely
continue to expand along with external linkages overall. An FTAA that fails to
address these distributional issues, however, stands little chance of passage but
even in the event of such a passage will likely be followed by a societal backlash
in Latin countries that undermines much of the political and institutional
development as well as the external business linkages that have been developed in
recent years.
Future research should seek to statistically investigate the determinants of
liberalizing or retrenching policy events and their sustainability across time.
Better understanding the specific stimuli for such substantial policy changes and
their durability would help policymakers and investors identify and prepare for
crucial opportunities to push through liberalizing policies and hold-off pressures
for retrenchment, Such analysis might also identify counter-intuitive policies that
enhance sustainability such as effective education or health care expenditure
which could subsequently be bundled with trade reform. The preliminary
evidence gathered here suggests that such research would both inform the debate
regarding the adoption of the FTAA and prepare managers for the future
evolution of trans-Pacific business linkages.
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Economic crisis
Inflation

Unemployment

1975: -1.6%; 1976: - 3.6%; 1978: -5.9%
1981: -7.1%; 1982: -6.4%; 1985: -9.0%
1988: -3.9%; 1989: -8.8%
1990: -3.7%

1975: 182%; 1976: 444%
1981: 104%; 1982: 165%; 1983: 344%; 1984: 627%; 1985: 672%
1986: 90%; 1987: 131%; 1988: 343%; 1989: 3080%
1990: 2314%

1980: 2.3%; 1985: 5.3%
1986: 4.4%; 1989: 7.3%
1990: 7.3%

Retrenchment 1974-85 1964 --> Autocracy
Liberalization 19881983 --> Democracy

1968: -14.2%; 1969: 0.6%; 1970: -2.8%
25% fall in eight consecutive years of decline

1972: 3.7%; 1973: 31.5%; 1974: 62.8%
1982: 124%; 1983: 276%; 1984: 1281%; 1985: 11750%; 1986: 276%

Liberalization
Retrenchment
Liberalization
Retrenchment
Liberalization

1978: 0.81% after averaging >6% 1968-76
1981: -6.5%; 1982: -1.6%; 1983: -5.4%
1988: -1.9%

TABLE 1 : Changes in External Linkages
Country
Episode Type Year

Regime Change?

Change in Real Per Capita GDP

External Pressure
Trading partner openness Multilateral Lending/GDP Aid/GNP

Debt Service/GDP

Argentina
Retrenchment
Liberalization
Retrenchment
Liberalization
Retrenchment
Liberalization

1963-65
1975-77 1973 --> Democracy
1978-80 1977 --> Autocracy
1985-89 1983 --> Democracy
1989-91
1991-

1962: -2.5%; 1963: -6.7%
From 32% (1972) to 45% (1974)
From 6% (1980) to 31% (198
From 0.1% (1984) to 0.6% From .04% in 1985 to 0.3% i From 31% (1985) to 37% (19

Bolivia

Brazil
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1967-74 1964 --> Autocracy
1974-78
1978-80
1984-89 1984 --> Democracy
1989-

Stagnant for four years

1981: 101%; 1982: 101%; 1983: 135%
1986: 147%; 1987: 228%; 1988: 629%; 1989: 1430%; 1999: 2948%

1980: 2.8%: 1983: 4.9%
1984: 2.4%; 1992: 6.5%

From 25% (1964) to 49% (1977)
From 0.2% (1981) to 0.6% (1984)

Chile
Liberalization 1973-75 1973 --> Autocracy
Retrenchment 1975-82
Liberalization 19831981 --> Constitution

1972: -2.5%; 1973: -6.5%
1975: -12.8%
1982: -11.7%; 1983: -5.3%

1971: 20.0%; 1972: 74.8%; 1973: 362%
1974: 505%; 1975: 375%

Liberalization 1965-

1963: -0.2%

1963: 32%

Retrenchment
Liberalization
Retrenchment
Liberalization

1975: -0.5%
1980: -2.2%; 1981: -5.1%; 1982: -9.9%
1985: -2.2%

1980: 10.4%; 1982: 19.6%

Colombia
Costa Rica
1974-76
1976-81
1982-86
1986-

1973: 15%; 1974: 30%
1981: 37%; 1982: 90%

1980: 5.9%; 1982: 9.4%
1984: 5.0%; 1985: 6.8%

From 1% (1983) to 3% (198From 1.4% (1980) to 7.7% (1From 24% (1980) to 57% (19

Dominican Republic
Liberalization 1965-74 1965 --> Autocracy
Retrenchment 1974-83
Liberalization 19831978 --> Democracy

1964: -15.2%
1981: -1.0%; 1983: -2.1%

From 2.2% (1964) to 8.9% (1965)
1983: 20%; 1984: 45%

From 6.3% (1974) to 31% (1

Ecuador
Liberalization 1970-74 1969-72 --> Autocracy 1969: -0.7%
Retrenchment 1974-81
Liberalization 19811979 --> Democracy

1974: 23.3%
From 10% (1975) to 72% (1982)

El Salvador
Liberalization 1969-77 1964-67 --> Democracy
Retrenchment 1979-89 1977-79 --> Autocracy 1978: -6.0%; 1979: -13.1%
Liberalization 19891984 --> Democracy
<1% cumulative growth 1982-88

From 26% (1963) to 34% (1968)
Averaged > 20% per annum 1984-89

From 29% (1986) to 37% (1989)

From 1.7% (1979) to 11% (1987)

Guatemala
Liberalization 1962-77
Retrenchment 1977-85 1969-82 --> Autocracy
Liberalization 19851983-86 --> Democracy 19% cumulative drop 1979-85

From 0.3% (1983) to 1.1% (1985)

From 5% (1980) to 17% (198

Haiti
Retrenchment
Liberalization
Retrenchment
Liberalization

1962-67 1958 --> F. Duvalier
1973-80 1972 --> J.C. Duvalier
1980-92
19941994 --> Democracy

negative cumulative growth over 10 years
1980: -4.4% after > 20% cumulative increase in 5 years
> 40% cumulative decline since 1979
1993: 39%

From 4% (1992) to 32% (1994)

Honduras
Liberalization ??-1980
Retrenchment 1980-87 1980 --> Democracy
Liberalization 1987-

1979: -2.7%; 1980: -0.7%
1985: -2.4%

1979: 19%

Retrenchment 1975-77
Liberalization 1977-

20% cumulative decline 1971-75
Additional 4% decline 1976-77

1973: 27%
1977: 34%

Jamaica

Mexico
Liberalization 1975Nicaragua
Liberalization
Liberalization
Retrenchment
Liberalization

1961-65
1971-74
1979-87
1987-

1962 --> Democracy
1970 --> Autocracy
3% cumulative fall 1969-71
1979 --> Democracy
1977: -10.6%; 1978: -28.7%
1988 --> End of State of 29% cumulative fall 1984-87

1978: 48%
1984: 219%; 1985: 681%; 1986: 911%; 1987: 10205%

1982: 3.4%; 1987: 6.0%

Panama
Retrenchment ??-1989
Liberalization 1989-97 1989 --> Democracy

1986: -3.8%; 1987: -15.1%; 1988: -0.5%

1985: 10.5%; 1989: 16.3%

Paraguay
Retrenchment
Liberalization
Retrenchment
Liberalization

1961-63
1976-80
1980-83
1983-

Retrenchment
Retrenchment
Liberalization
Retrenchment
Liberalization

1961-65
1968-71 1968 --> Autocracy
1976-80 1977 --> Democracy
1980-87
1989-

1961: -1.1%
From 27% (1972) to 40% (1976)
1981: -6.5%; 1982: -5.8%

1981: 5.6%; 1982: 8.3%

Peru
1967: -2.4%
1975: -0.8%; 1976: -2.3%; 1977: -2.4%

1967: 19%

1987: -10.5%; 1988: -10.8%

1987: 667%; 1988: 3399%; 1989: 7482%

1986: 4.8; 1988: 7.9%
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Trinidad & Tobago
Retrenchment 1965-67 1966 --> Democracy
Retrenchment 1980-85
Liberalization 1987-97

1964: -0.5%

From 0.1% (1962) to 2.3% (1965)
1980: 17.5%

Cumulative 18% drop 1983-87

1981: 10%; 1987: 22.3%

Uruguay
Retrenchment
Liberalization
Retrenchment
Retrenchment

1960-64
1973-77 1971-74 --> Autocracy 1970: -0.6%; 1971: -1.3%
1977-82
1977: 0.9%
1983-88
1981: -10.3%; 1982: -10.8%; 1983: -1.8%

Liberalization
Retrenchment
Liberalization
Retrenchment
Retrenchment

1972-74
1974-83
1983-90
1990-95
1997-

1971: 76%; 1972: 97%

Venezuela
1970: -1.9%; 1971: -2.1%
1973: -1.4%; 1974: -0.7%
25% cumulative drop 1976-84
1988: -11.0%
1997: -1.8%; 1998: -7.9%

1988: 84%
1995: 100%

1981: 7%; 1983: 13%
1987: 7.3%; 1989: 10.4%
1992: 6.7%; 1998: 14.9%

Brought to you by | University of Pennsylvania
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/7/16 4:18 PM

DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1083

18

Henisz: The Political Economy of Trans-Pacific Business Linkages

19
9

19
9

19
9

19
9

8

19
9

19
8

19
8

4

2

19
8

19
8

19
8

19
7

19
7

19
7

19
7

19
7

19
6

19
6

19
6

19
6

8

10
6

0
4

20

2

1

0

30

6

2

4

40

0

3

8

50

6

4

2

60

0

5

8

70

6

6

4

80

2

7

0

90

Percentage of GDP (trade)

Unweighted Openness Measures

8

19
6

Percentage of GDP

Figure 1: Openness

-1

0
gfdi

nfdi

bonds

equity

aid

trade

Population Weighted Openness
45

6

40
5
35
4

25

20

2

15
1
10

5

19
98

96
19

19
94

19
92

19
90

19
88

19
86

19
84

19
82

19
80

76

74

78
19

19

19

70

68

72
19

19

19

64

66
19

62

19

19

60

0

-1

0
gfdi

nfdi

bonds

equity

aid

trade

19

Brought to you by | University of Pennsylvania
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/7/16 4:18 PM

Percent of GDP (trade)

3

19

Percent of GDP

30

Business and Politics, Vol. 6 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 2

Figure 2: Political Institutions
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Figure 3: Count of Regimes
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Appendix 1: Country Narratives
•

•

•

Argentina. Argentina experienced its first retrenchment after the recession of
1962-63. Then followed a decade of relative stability in external linkages
under the military governments of 1966-73 during which time real per capita
incomes soared 60%. Subsequently, Argentina experienced fitful
liberalizations episodes under the brief democratic regime of the Perons from
1973-1976 and after the return of democracy under Raul Alfonsin in 1983 that
each ended in hyperinflation and contributed to a steady decline in real per
capita income. Despite the more than 25% reduction in real per capita income,
there was no substantive reduction in external linkages perhaps due to the
numerous checks and balances that characterized the relatively stable
Argentine political regime. After inflation peaked over 3000% in 1989, the
new Argentine government of Carlos Menem launched a more sustainable
economic reform program that simultaneously tackled inflation and
committed the economy to openness particularly with its partners in
MERCOSUR. Within a decade, real per capita income had increased by over
one third.
Bolivia. Political instability and regime change in the 1968-71 period ended in
hyperinflation and the reversion of prior progress in the establishment of
external linkages. After the taming of hyperinflation in the late 1980s, external
linkages again began a steady upward trend. During the next twelve-year
period, real per capita income increased by over 20% but remained more than
10% below their 1979 peak and 5% below the previous peak of 1968. The
onset of a relatively mild recession in 1999 triggered a partial reversion in
external linkages despite the development of strong checks and balances
within the policymaking structure perhaps because economic and social
progress had been relatively moderate under the democratic regime.
Brazil. Beginning shortly after the consolidation of autocracy in Brazil in
1965, a near decade period of steady growth and increased external linkages
contributed to a more than doubling of real per capita income. As growth
slowed in the mid-1970s, external linkages were reduced and entered a period
of volatility. The sharp recession of 1981-83 culminated in a regime change
and the onset of democratization in 1984 under Jose Sarney. Brazil then began
an expansionist policy that briefly improved economic performance but
ultimately culminated in hyperinflation and a two decade low in external
linkages in 1989. Another expansionist though less severe cycle characterized
the leadership of the National Reconstruction leaderships of Presidents
Fernando Collor and Itamar Franco and ended in 1994-95 with the election of
Fernando Cardoso of the Brazilian Social Democratic Party at which time a
sustained period of growth in incomes and external linkages under low
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inflation began. External linkages did not revert during the 1998-99 recession
perhaps aided by the strong checks and balances in the new Brazilian political
system and a honeymoon effect that remained from the slaying of inflation.
The steep rise of unemployment and increase in male and female mortality
rates, however, called into question the sustainability of these policies in the
medium term.
Chile. Chile underwent a regime change in 1973 replacing the democratically
elected President Allende with the military junta of General Pinochet. After a
rapid liberalization of the economy including an expansion of external
linkages, a hyperinflationary episode followed which triggered a collapse in
real per capita income growth as well as a pause in the growth of external
linkages. Rapid growth in external linkages resumed after the passage of the
1981 constitution, which called for a return to democracy and survived the
steep 1983-84 recession. Per capita income grew at steady and sustainable
rates since 1985 leading real per capita income to more than double in twenty
years. Since the inception of democracy, external trade linkages have trended
slightly downward through capital linkages have soared.
Colombia. Colombia exhibits relatively steady democratic institutions, per
capita income growth and moderate inflation throughout the 1960-98 period
and steady growth in trade linkages after 1965. Liberalization survived the
mild 1976 and 1983 recessions as well as the more severe 1998-99 recession
perhaps due to the well-developed political institutions that provided a status
quo bias for trade policy.
Costa Rica. While the Costa Rican democracy remains among the strongest in
Latin America, the inflationary episodes of 1973-74 and 1979-82 both
triggered recessions and substantive pauses in otherwise uninterrupted growth
of external linkages and per capita income levels.
Dominican Republic. External linkages rose substantially over the 1965-74
period under the Presidency of Juan Balaguer who emerged from a military
triumvirate that assumed power after the brief Presidency of Juan Bosch of the
Revolutionary Party. This progress was largely reversed in 1975-83 as the rate
of economic growth and progress in social indicators slowed. The
consolidation of democracy and return of Juan Balaguer to power in 1987 led
to another burst of growth in external linkages that survived the steep 1989-90
recession that tamed inflation and continued through 2000 and led to a 50%
increase in real per capita incomes over that period. Of some concern,
however, is the dramatic slowdown in the rate of improvement of social
welfare indicators under the democratic regime.
Ecuador. The end of a brief experiment with democracy in the late 1960s led
to a surge in external linkages followed by a collapse that expanded again
after Ecuador’s transition to democracy in 1979. Real per capita income levels
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doubled during this period but stagnated under democratic rule as moderate
inflation began to escalate. External linkages have trended slowly upwards
without a significant reversion since the consolidation of the democratic
regime but have not yet regained their 1975 peak.
El Salvador. External linkages, per capita income levels and inflation all
expanded together in the 1970s under the expansionist policies of the National
Conciliation Party. The growth collapse associated with domestic unrest that
escalated into civil war over the late 1970s and early 1980s triggered a
collapse in external linkages and culminated in the return of democracy in
1984. The nascent democracy undertook an expansionist policy leading to a
moderate spike in inflation, which peaked in 1985. By the late 1980s and
more clearly in the early 1990s, per capita income growth began to accelerate,
inflation was attenuated and external linkages began to return towards their
peak of the late 1970s.
Guatemala. External linkages and real per capita income grew in tandem
throughout the 1960s and 1970s even as democracy was undermined, human
rights abuses expanded and power grew increasingly concentrated in the
hands of a series of right-wing governments. The positive economic trends
were broken at the onset of the Latin American debt crisis. The subsequent
recession coincided with a regime change in 1986 and the new democratically
elected government reemphasized external linkages and the country returned
to a relatively stable period of growth in per capita income. External linkages
grew throughout the period with noteable accelerations in 1986-90 and 19962000.
Haiti. After an extended experiment with increasing autarky under Francois
Duvalier, the Haitian government expanded external linkages from 1973
through the early 1980s under his son Jean-Claude Duvalier. Real per capita
income levels climbed over 20% but in 1981 a reversion began that
accelerated as the society crumbled (both male and female mortality rates
increased steadily over the next twenty years and real per capita income fell
by more than a third). The onset of regime change and eventual
democratization in 1995 led to some shift in favor of external linkages and a
halting of the decline in real per capita income but also an acceleration in the
degradation of social indicators.
Honduras. After over two decades of steadily increasing external linkages and
real per capita incomes, Honduras began a regime change towards democracy
in 1981 that led to a shift in policy and a decrease in external linkages though
notable improvement occurred in social indicators. In 1986, after a two-year
return to military rule, Liberal President Jose Simeon initiated an increase in
external linkages but also the first of a series of expansionist policies that led
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to an acceleration of inflation and no growth in real per capita income or
social indicators.
Jamaica. Jamaica does not present a clear relationship between political
variables, economic performance and external linkages. External linkages
were relatively stable during the 1960-1972 period when per capita incomes
doubled and social indicators were improving dramatically. A reversion
occurred during the post 1973 recession under the first administration of the
People’s National Party and Prime Minister Michael Manley but external
linkages began to expand again in 1977 and continued to expand through a
period of increasingly expansionist cycles initiated by Manley and his
successors from both parties that saw inflation climb and real per capita
incomes fall back to their 1960 levels. In the late 1980s and 1990s, foreign
direct investment began to flow in and real per capita incomes made up onehalf of their previous fall though they began to fall again after inflation was
brought under control in the mid-1990s, the improvement in social indicators
plateaued and political instability began to rise.
Mexico. Mexico has exhibited a steady increase in external linkages,
democratization of political institutions and improvement in social indicators
over the 1975-2000 period. Real per capita incomes improved by 150% from
1960-80 then stagnated for over a decade after the Latin American debt crisis
as inflation soared. Since the control of inflation and the passage of NAFTA
in 1995, the expansion of external linkages has accelerated and real per capita
incomes have resumed their upward trend increasing by over 25% in only five
years.
Nicaragua. External linkages were on a gradual upward trend in the 1960s
and 1970s until the victory of the Sandinista movement and associated
escalation of the civil war including American military intervention of the
early 1980s triggered an economic depression. The state of emergency was
lifted in 1988 and external linkages began to expand. They subsequently
paused their growth as expansionist policies led to both hyperinflation and
soaring unemployment. With the control of inflation and the consolidation of
democracy in the early 1990s under Prime Minister Violeta Chamorro,
external linkages soared and real per capita incomes began to climb though
improvement in social indicators plateaued.
Panama. Only partial data on external linkages is available for Panama prior
to 1980 at which time such flows were contracting precipitously, real per
capital income was falling and unemployment was soaring. Beginning with
the US imposed regime change in 1990, external linkages recovered rapidly as
did per capita incomes.
Paraguay. External linkages were relatively stable during the Paraguayan
boom of 1960-80 when real per capita incomes almost doubled. They trended
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downwards in the late 1970s and early 1980s along with real per capita
incomes and then began to rise rapidly particularly after the 1990
democratization and subsequent control over inflation. While real per capital
incomes never reattained their 1980s peak, social indicators showed some
improvement over this period.
Peru. Peru’s external linkages contracted steadily until the consolidation of
the military regime of Juan Velasco in the early 1970s at which point they
began an upward trend that lasted until the reinstitution of democracy in 1979
(itself following the recession of 1976-78) which triggered a steep downward
trend in real per capita incomes and the acceleration of inflation into
hyperinflation (almost 7,500% in 1989) until Fujimori’s victory over the
Shining Path insurgency again reversed the trend. From 1993-97, eternal
linkages expanded dramatically and real per capita income increased by
almost one third though they remain below the level attained in the 1970s.
Despite a recession in 1998-99, external linkages have not declined perhaps
due to the consolidation of a system of checks and balances in the country’s
political institutions.
Trinidad & Tobago. External linkages contracted dramatically shortly after
the institution of the first democratically elected Parliament in 1966. External
linkages thereafter remained on a slight downward trajectory through the
doubling of real per capita income to 1981 and its 20% reduction to 1987. At
the nadir of the 1983-89 recession however, the first government of the
National Alliance for Reconstruction under Prime Minister Arthur Robinson
reversed this long-standing trend and external linkages began to climb
upward. While this shift coincided with an increase in real per capita income
which regained the 1981 peak, social indicators actually deteriorated during
this economic boom. The trend continued under successor governments of
both parties and the 1992-93 recession, highlighting the strength of the
nation’s system of checks and balances.
Uruguay. External linkages were volatile but trending downwards as real per
capita income stagnated from 1960-74. After a regime change in 1974, the
new autocratic government shifted course and pursued a policy that enhanced
external linkages. It abruptly shifted course during the growth pause of 1977
and again during the deep recession of 1982-85. The reintroduction of
democracy in 1986 saw a return of the gradual downward trend in external
linkages now with growth in real per capita incomes.
Venezuela. External linkages trended gently downwards and per capita income
gently upwards under the democratic regime from 1960 to 1977 with the
exception of the surge in the dollar value of linkages provided by the 1973 oil
shock. The economy began to deteriorate in the late 1970s and experienced
negative real per capita growth for eight consecutive years. External linkages
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recovered in the late 1980s and accelerated in the early 1990s though real per
capita incomes were stagnant or even falling below their levels of 1960 and
inflation was accelerating. The election of Hugo Chavez in 1998 triggered a
reversion of external linkages and an acceleration of the deterioration of real
per capita incomes.
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